Case Summaries

Construction

[01/26] Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc.
In a suit brought by a husband and wife based on injuries sustained after the husband, an independent contractor, was injured on a worksite on which the defendant was operating as the general contractor, judgment against the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on a breach of regulatory duty theory of recovery, as the defendant delegated its obligation to comply with Cal-OSHA workplace regulations to the plaintiff; but 2) the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' retained control theory of direct liability, since the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a triable issue on affirmative contribution.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

[01/23] Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction, Inc.
In a suit in which a defendant sought to recover the interest it paid on the sums it borrowed to secure a bank’s letter of credit on an appeal bond, the court of appeal's judgment that the interest was not recoverable is affirmed, as California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(d)(1)(F) does not extend to interest expenses incurred to borrow funds to provide security for a letter of credit.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/17] Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno
In a suit by an importer of foreign cement seeking a declaratory judgment that two statutes of Puerto Rico violate the dormant foreign commerce clause, the district court's judgment invalidating the statutes is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the federal Buy American Act does not preempt the statutes; 2) Puerto Rico, by its statute requiring that local construction projects financed with funds from the federal government or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico use only construction materials manufactured in Puerto Rico, is acting as a market participant not subject to the Commerce Clause; and 3) certain provisions of Puerto Rico's statute imposing labeling requirements on cement sold in Puerto Rico discriminate against sellers of foreign cement in violation of the dormant foreign commerce clause.

[12/29] Northern Plains Resources Council, Inc v. The Surface Transportation Bd.
In a challenge to respondent-Transportation Board's approval of certain railroad construction applications, orders are: 1) reversed in part where the Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at certain material environmental impacts inherent in two of the applications as required by NEPA; and 2) affirmed in part where the Board did not err in its public convenience and necessity analyses, except with respect to its reliance on the viability of a flawed, preceding application during the approval of a subsequent application.

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